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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United ______
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.______ ___________________
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
REITER ET AL. v. COOPER, TRUSTEE FOR CAROLINA MOTOR EXPRESS, INC., ET AL. ____
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-1496. Argued December 1, 1992 - Decided March 8, 1993
The Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) requires that motor common carriers charge the
tariff rates they file with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 49
U. S. C. S10762, and that such rates be ``reasonable,'' S17701(a). Between
1984 and 1986, petitioner shippers tendered shipments to Carolina Motor
Express, a motor carrier subject to ICC regulation, at negotiated rates that
were lower than the applicable tariff rates on file with the ICC. When
Carolina filed for bankruptcy, respondents, the trustee in bankruptcy and a
rate auditing firm, brought adversary proceedings against petitioners in the
Bankruptcy Court to recover the difference between the negotiated and tariff
rates. Petitioners responded, inter alia, that the tariff rates were unlawful ___________
because they were unreasonably high. The Bankruptcy Court entered judgment
for respondents based on the tariff rates, but the District Court reversed and
referred petitioners' defenses to the ICC. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding the petitioners' ``unreasonable-rate'' claims were no obstacle to
respondents' actions because, even if the tariff rates were unreasonable, the
``filed rate doctrine'' required petitioners to pay those rates first and then
seek relief in a separate action under S11705(b)(3), which gives shippers an
express cause of action against carriers for damages (reparations) in the
amount of the difference between the tariff rate and the rate determined by
the ICC to be reasonable.
Held: _____
1. Petitioners' unreasonable-rate claims under S11705(b)(3) are subject to
the ordinary rules governing counterclaims. Pp. 3-8.
(a) While respondents are technically correct that the
I II REITER v. COOPER ____
Syllabus
unreasonable-rate issue cannot be asserted as a defense, petitioners'
S11705(b)(3) claims relate to the same shipments for which respondents seek to
collect and, thus, are properly raised here as counterclaims. It makes no
difference that the counterclaims may have been mistakenly designated as
defenses. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). Pp. 3-4.
(b) The 2-year limitation for bringing a civil action under S11705(b)(3) is
not applicable here since petitioners' claims seek merely recoupment. See
United States v. Western Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 59, 71. Pp. 4-6. _____________ _______________________
(c) Nothing in the ICA provides that, in a carrier's undercharge collection
action, a S11705(b)(3) counterclaim is not subject to the normally applicable
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 54(b).
That Rule permits a district court to enter separate final judgment on any
claim or counterclaim after making ``an express determination that there is no
just reason for delay.'' The ``filed rate doctrine'' - which embodies the
principle that a shipper cannot avoid paying the tariff rate by invoking
common-law claims and defenses - does not preclude avoidance of the tariff
rate through claims and defenses that are specifically accorded by the ICA
itself. Crancer v. Lowden, 315 U. S. 631, distinguished. Pp. 6-8. _______ _______
2. Respondents' arguments that petitioners' counterclaims are not yet
cognizable in court are rejected. Pp. 8-11.
(a) The contention that paying the tariff rate is a prerequisite for
litigating the reasonableness issue finds no support in the ICA. Rather, the
ICA provides that a claim related to shipment of property accrues on delivery
or tender of delivery, S11706(g). Pp. 8-9.
(b) Nor are petitioners required initially to present their claims to the
ICC. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires only that a court enable
``referral'' to an administrative agency of a claim containing an issue within
the agency's special competence, but does not deprive the court of
jurisdiction. And the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies -
which would deprive the court of jurisdiction - is inapplicable here, both
because the ICC has long interpreted the ICA as giving it no power to decree
reparations itself, and because the Court can discern within the ICA no intent
that ICC determination of the reasonable-rate issue must be obtained before
filing the civil action. Pp. 9-11.
3. The courts below made no ``express determination'' required under Rule
54(b) for entry of a separate judgment on respondents' claims, and it cannot
be said categorically that it would be an abuse of discretion either to grant
or to deny such judgment. Although insolvency of the claimant is a factor
weighing against separate judgment in that claimant's favor, this Court cannot
say that REITER v. COOPER III ____
Syllabus
insolvency is an absolute bar. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., ____________________ ____________________
446 U. S. 1, followed. Pp. 11-12.
949 F. 2d 107, reversed and remanded.
SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and
WHITE, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN,
J., dissented.